The prospects and challenges of the proposed carbon tax regime in South Africa: lessons from the Nigerian experience by Akinwande, G
AKINWANDE: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE PROPOSED CARBON TAX REGIME IN SOUTH AFRICA         177
THE PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE  
PROPOSED CARBON TAX REGIME IN SOUTH AFRICA: 




One of the policy instruments canvassed for the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is carbon tax. Carbon tax- an economic instrument 
which levies taxes on the carbon content of goods and services, is increas-
ingly getting popular among policy makers worldwide. South Africa is one 
of the countries with advanced plans to adopt carbon tax as a way of re-
ducing and discouraging the emission of GHGs. This paper analyses the 
proposed carbon tax in the light of South Africa’s commitment under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
What lessons can South Africa learn from a similar environmental tax re-
gime previously adopted in Nigeria? 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Greenhouse gas (GHGs) emissions from developing countries will like-ly surpass those from developed countries within the first half of this 
century, highlighting the need for developing country efforts to reduce the 
risk of climate change. According to the Stern Review,1 even if the developed 
world takes on responsibilities for absolute cuts in emissions of 60-80 per-
cent by 2050, developing countries must take significant action too, in order 
to avoid temperature increases above 2.0 °C. One of the policy instruments 
canvassed for the reduction of GHGs is the carbon tax. Simply put, carbon 
tax refers to a tax on activities or production processes that can give rise 
to GHGs emissions. The goal of carbon tax is to reduce environmentally 
harmful behaviour by ensuring that emitters of greenhouse gases bear the 
full costs of their actions. 
South Africa is one of the very few countries in Africa that have devel-
oped concrete plans to implement the carbon tax system. The tentative date 
for the implementation of the policy is 2015. This paper seeks to examine 
the proposed carbon tax vis-a- vis South Africa’s commitment under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
What lessons can South Africa learn from previous tax regime in Nigeria 
if it decides to go ahead with the plan to implement a carbon tax system?
This paper is divided into five parts. After this introduction, part two 
discusses the meaning , theory and practice of a carbon tax system. Part three 
evaluates the proposed carbon tax regime in South Africa, its likely challenges 
and prospects. Part four highlights the practical lessons that South Africa can 
draw from the Nigerian experience. The paper concludes in part five.
2. THE CARBON TAX SYSTEM:  
THEORY AND PRACTICE
Economists regard pollution as a negative externality. Externalities refer to a situation where effects of production or consumption are borne 
by others but cannot be traced to the originator2. The main indicia of an 
externality is the separation between the affected individual and the source 
1 Nicholas Stern, Economics of Climate Change the Stern Review (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007)
2 International Institute for Sustainable Development, “Market Failures Leading to Environ-
mental Degradation” <http://www.iisd.org/greenbud/market.htm> accessed 20 May 2014 
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of the effects. Externality is not reflected in the price of goods and services.3 
Thus, goods and services are underpriced because the total cost of produc-
tion (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) are not reflected in the purchase price. 
This is a market failure that has to be addressed through government inter-
vention. When faced with a negative externality such as pollution, the solu-
tion should be to impose a per unit tax on the emissions from a polluting 
activity.4The tax rate would be equal to the marginal external social damage 
caused by the last unit of pollution, at the efficient allocation. Faced with 
this tax on emissions, firms would “internalize” the externality. By mini-
mizing their private costs, firms would simultaneously minimize the costs to 
society as a whole.5The carbon tax system is anchored on the Polluter Pays 
principle. The Polluter Pays principle states that: 
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internaliza-
tion of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, 
taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in princi-
ple, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest 
and without distorting international trade and investment.6
A carbon tax is attractive because it creates a stable price for emissions 
and a stable price for emissions is important for firms making long term 
decisions about investment and innovation in low emission technologies.7 
Carbon taxes automatically transfer funds from emitting industries to the 
public revenue. The revenue may be used to enhance the revenue base; limit 
the overall tax burden on the industry affected through revenue recycling; 
reduce taxes elsewhere in the economy. Revenue recycling to the industry 
can encourage emitters to reduce GHG emissions, without increasing their 
overall tax burden relative to other parts of the economy. The advantage of 
this approach is that it can ease the initial impact of the scheme for those 
industries facing the greatest increase in costs, and therefore ease the transi-
tion where carbon taxes are introduced.8 
3 Ibid.
4 TH Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: Principles and Practice (Washington, D.C.: RFF Press, 
2006) at 2.
5 Ibid
6 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 13 June 1992, UN Doc. A/
CONF.151/26 (vol. I); Principle 16, 31 ILM 874 (1992).
7 IMF ‘Climate Change and the Global Economy’(IMF 2008) 23,<http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/pdf/c4.pdf> accessed May 23 2014 
8 Stern(n 2 ) 318-319
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Norway like other Scandinavian countries introduced carbon tax in the 
1990s. The revenue generated from environment taxes was aimed at reduc-
ing labour taxes in the economy.9 The tax initially covered sixty percent of all 
Norwegian energy related CO2 emissions. The tax generated substantial rev-
enues; in 1993 the tax represented 0.7 percent of total revenue, which in year 
2001 had increased to 1.7 percent. The tax is estimated to have reduced CO2 
emissions by approximately 2.3 per cent between 1990 and 1999. Overall in 
Norway, between 1990-1999 GDP grew by approximately 23 percent, yet 
emissions only grew by roughly 4 percent over the same period, indicating a 
decoupling of emissions growth from economic growth.10 It has been argued 
that the tax helped to provide incentives for technological innovation.11
3 PROPOSED CARBON TAX IN SOUTH AFRICA:  
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
A few background facts about the country, South Africa, are apposite here. South Africa is a middle-income developing country whose econ-
omy is built on the wealth of its mineral resources and its primary sectors;12 
its population was estimated to be roughly 50 million in 2010.13 South Afri-
ca is the most industrialised country in Africa with well-developed mining, 
transport, energy, manufacturing, tourism, agriculture, and services sectors. 
The South African economy is powered by coal14 and its contribution to 
the global pool of greenhouse gases is 1.8 percent.15 Its total emissions in 
2000 were estimated to be 461 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents 
(CO2e).
16 Eighty-three percent of emissions are derived from energy supply 
and consumption, 7 percent from industrial processes, 8 percent from agri-




12 South Africa’s Second National Communication under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (Department of Environmental Affairs 2011) 8 <http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/zafnc02.pdf>.
13 Statistics SA cited in South Africa’s Second National Communication (n 13) 3.
14 Patrick Bond, “Privatization of the Air Turns Lethal: Pay to Pollute Kills South African 
Activist Sajida Khan”,18 CNS(2007) 4 ,19.
15 Ibid. South Africa is the 17th largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world. See ‘Climate 
Analysis Indicators Tool CAIT Version 5.0’ (Washington DC World Resources Institute 
2008).
16 South Africa’s Second National Communication (n 13), ix.
17 Ibid.
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In 2011, South Africa formally published its National Climate Change 
Response Policy. The Policy has two objectives:
i. Effectively manage inevitable climate change impacts through interven-
tions that build and sustain South Africa’s social, economic and envi-
ronmental resilience and emergency response capacity. 
ii. Make a fair contribution to the global effort to stabilise greenhouse gas 
(GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that avoids danger-
ous anthropogenic interference with the climate system within a time-
frame that enables economic, social and environmental development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner.18
 
South Africa has also developed what is called Long Term Mitigation 
Scenarios (LTMS). The idea behind the LTMS was to develop broad and 
sound mitigation scenarios that will form the basis of a long-term climate 
policy.19 LTMS is a detailed study of South Africa’s mitigation potential. 
Acting on the LTMS, South Africa announced at COP15 (the 2009 climate 
change conference in Copenhagen Denmark) that its emissions should peak 
in the period from 2020 to 2025, remain stable for around a decade, and 
decline thereafter in absolute terms.20
As part of its international commitment to fight climate change, South 
Africa is considering the use of a carbon tax to reduce its emissions; South 
Africa National Treasury started experimenting with environmental taxes 
in 2006. In 2010, it published a Discussion Paper on various designs of a 
carbon tax. The proposed tax would cover all direct, stationary sources, and 
process emissions. The tax would apply to methane, carbon dioxide, and 
nitrous oxide.21 The implementation was meant to start in October 2014 
in two phases: the first running to 2019, and the second to 2025; but it has 
now been shifted to 2015. The initial proposed rate is ZAR 120 per tCO2e, 
applying above a certain threshold of a firm’s emissions, and would in-
crease 10 percent annually until 2019-20.22 In the first phase, the tax would 
18 South Africa “National Climate Change Response White Paper” (2011) 5,<http://www.
info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=152834>.
19 Harold Winker, “Long Term Mitigation Scenario Project Report” 1, <http://www.erc.uct.
ac.za/Research/LTMS/LTMS_project_report.pdf>.
20 National Climate Change Response (n19) 27.
21 Sara Moarif & Namrata Rastogi, “Market Based Climate Mitigation Policies in Emerging 
Economies” (2012), Center for Climate and Energy Solutions Publications ,21.
22 Ibid.
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only apply to 40 percent of total emissions (basic threshold at 60 percent). 
Trade-exposed sectors with competitiveness concerns and process emissions 
would receive an additional exemption of 10 percent each. An offset mech-
anism is also envisaged to offset carbon tax liability up to a maximum of 5 
or 10 percent. Revenue would not be earmarked, but consideration given to 
environmental issues when determining revenue use, particularly to energy 
efficiency and assistance to low-income households.23
The proposed tax is not the first tax targeted at greenhouse gas emissions 
in South Africa. There is already in place a levy of ZAR 3.5c/ kWh on electric-
ity generated from fossil fuel.24 There is also a tax on new vehicles in place;25 
new passenger cars are taxed on carbon dioxide emissions above 120 g/km at a 
fixed rate of ZAR 75 per g/km. For example, if a new passenger car emits 200 
g/km of carbon dioxide, it will be taxed on the 80 g/km emitted above the 120 
g/km threshold. At the suggested flat rate of ZAR 75 per g/km, such a vehicle 
will attract a carbon tax of ZAR 6,000.26 This particular tax seeks to reduce 
emissions from the transport sector; it is targeted at the manufacturers as well 
as buyers of vehicles that are not environmentally friendly. The proposed tax 
differs from the already implemented taxes because it is a universal carbon tax. 
Ideally, for a tax to be environmentally effective, the tax rate should 
equal the social marginal damages from producing an additional unit of 
emissions or, more or less equivalently, the social marginal benefit from 
abating a unit of emissions.27 
Thus, the optimal tax rate would be where the marginal benefit of abate-
ment equals the marginal cost of abatement.28 To arrive at the optimal rate, the 
government would need to estimate both the marginal abatement cost curve and 
the marginal abatement benefit curve. Estimating the marginal abatement cost 
curve and the marginal benefit curve is an uncertain science. Climate change as 
a global problem means that damage costs have to be assessed globally.Asking 
local polluters to pay the global damage costs seems unfair. Such a system would 
probably succeed if there were an international carbon tax. The National Trea-
sury of South Africa seems to appreciate this fact when it said thus:
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 South Africa’s Second National Communication ( n 13) ,185.
26 Anja Finnern, “Carbon Tax”, (Accountancy SA ,December 2010) : <http://www.accoun-
tancysa.org.za/resources/ShowItemArticle.asp?ArticleId=2092&Issue=1099 > accessed 
April 2013
27 Arthur Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 192-93, (4th ed Transaction Publishers 2002) 
cited in Gilbert Metcalf & David Weisback , “The Design of a Carbon Tax” 33, HarvLRev 
(2009)499.
28 Gilbert Metcalf & David Weisback, ibid at 511.
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The tax rate should, over time, be equivalent to the marginal external 
damage costs of GHGs to affect appropriate incentives. However, in the 
absence of an international climate change agreement and therefore a 
global emissions pricing system, a partial, rather than full, internalisa-
tion of the externality will be considered as an interim measure.29 Even 
if a uniform tax is adopted, the end result is that polluters would under-
take to implement those emission reductions that are cheaper than pay-
ing the tax, because each emitter weighs the cost of emissions control 
against the cost of emitting and paying the tax.30 It does not offer an 
incentive to polluters that want to make aggressive cuts in emissions.
Another thing that emerges from the literature on environmental taxes 
is that environmental taxes cannot guarantee environmental certainty. This 
is due to the fact that, at the time of setting the tax, policy makers do not 
have all the required information regarding technological progress and price 
sensitivities;31 so, setting the tax at the required level to meet the emission 
target becomes difficult. New entrants into the polluting industry can also 
upset the whole arrangement, in that their activities could lead to increased 
emissions.32 To ensure that the environmental goal is not diluted by reason 
of new polluting sources, the tax level has to be adjusted.
Environmental certainty is important when considering South Africa’s 
LTMS target, which anticipates a peak, a plateau, and a decline. A peak by 
2020 or 2025 and a decline thereafter mean that the environmental out-
come must be certain as of 2015, when tax is meant to be introduced until 
2020 or 2025. The policy makers in South Africa are well aware of this 
point. In the National Climate Response White Paper, the government said: 
Although a carbon tax does not set a fixed quantitative limit on GHG 
emissions over the short-term, such a tax—at an appropriate level and 
phased in over a period to the “correct” level—will provide a strong 
price signal to both producers and consumers to change their behaviour 
over the medium- to long-term. The National Treasury’s carbon tax 
policy will seek to primarily stimulate behaviour change through the 
29 National Climate Change Response ( n 19) 41.
30 Gupta S et al “Policies, Instruments and Cooperative Arrangements” in Metz, Davidson, 
Bosch, Dave, LA Meyer, eds, Climate Change 2007- Mitigation of Climate Change (Cam-
bridge University Press 2007) 745 at 755.
31 Tools of the Trade :A Guide to Designing and Operating a Cap and Trade Program (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency 2003), 2-6.
32 Ibid.
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price mechanism, and as a secondary benefit, generate a revenue stream 
that may allow fiscal decisions over time that support climate change 
policy and broader sustainable development objectives.33
The revenue to be generated from the tax is estimated to be between R8 
billion and R30 billion a year.34 Whether the tax will instil a behavioural 
change remains to be seen. This claim can only be satisfactorily investigated 
ex post, but if Nigeria’s experience with the use of pollution charges reveals 
anything, it is that taxes or pollution charges by themselves are not enough 
to instil behavioural change.
4. IMPLEMENTING A CARBON TAX REGIME:  
PRACTICAL LESSONS FROM NIGERIA
Environmental taxation has, from the onset, been an integral part of the gas flaring legal regime in Nigeria, and has been one of their govern-
ment’s frontline policies in seeking to eliminate flaring. This section high-
lights the practical lessons that South Africa can draw from the implemen-
tation of an environmental tax system in Nigeria.
In principle, Section 3 of the Associated Gas Reinjection Act outlaws 
gas flaring, but allows polluters to continue to flare on payment of a fine. 
The Section provides as follows:
Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no company engaged in 
the production of oil or gas shall after 1 January, 1984 flare gas 
produced in association with oil without the permission in writing 
of the Minister [1985 No.7.]
(2) Where the Minister is satisfied after 1 January 1984 that util-
isation or re-injection of the produced gas is not appropriate or 
feasible in a particular field or fields, he may issue a certificate in 
that respect to a company engaged in the production of oil or gas-
(a) Specifying such terms and conditions, as he may at his discretion 
choose to impose, for the continued flaring of gas in the particular 
field or fields; or
33 National Climate Change Response( n19) 41.
34 Phinehas Machingan, “SA Government to boost Revenue through Carbon Tax’(ESI AFRI-
CA, April 16 2013):<http://www.esi-africa.com/sa-government-to-boost-revenues-through-
carbon-tax/>
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(b) Permitting the company to continue to flare gas in the particular 
field or fields if the company pays such sum as the Minister may 
from time to time prescribe for every 28.317 standard cubic metre 
(SCM) of gas flared:
Provided that, any payment due under this paragraph shall be made 
in the same manner and be subject to the same procedure as for 
the payment of royalties to the Federal Government by companies 
engaged in the production of oil.35
The penalty was initially fixed at 2 kobo (equivalent to US$0.0009 in 
1985) against the oil companies for each 1,000 standard cubic feet (scf) of 
gas flared. In 1990, the penalty was increased to 50 kobo/10,000 scf. This 
was further raised to 10 naira/1000 scf in 1998. In 2008, the penalty was 
raised to US$3.50 (equivalent to 560 naira today) for every 1,000 scf of gas 
flared. Nigeria is also planning to raise the penalty to the international mar-
ket value of the tax flared.36 In 2012, the Nigerian National Petroleum Cor-
poration (NNPC) confirmed that flare is only down by 15 percent, which 
means 85 percent of Nigerian gas is still being flared.37 The negligible rate 
of reduction rate in flaring in Nigeria after many years of implementing this 
tax system raises questions on whether environmental taxes significantly 
discourage pollution. It also raises questions on the effectiveness of the mon-
itoring and reporting system put in place to ensure that reduction rates are 
proactively disclosed and verified.
The Nigerian situation is relevant to the South African situation be-
cause the enactment of the tax in Nigeria followed the “slow ramp-up” 
approach, which is what the National Treasury of South Africa wants to 
use as well. In a “slow ramp-up” approach,38 the tax is introduced gradu-
ally over time, starting with a low initial rate or a narrow initial base and 
35 Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1985 (Nig), Section 3.
36 Petroleum Industry Bill, An Act to Provide for the Establishment of a Legal, Fiscal and 
Regulatory Framework For the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria and Other Related Matters , 
7th National Assembly, 2012, Section 277(3).
37 Adeola Yusuf, “FG Confirms 85 percent flaring by IOCs” Daily Independent Newspaper 
<dailyindependentnig.com/2012/12/fg-confirms-85-gas-flaring-by-iocs/ daily independent 
newspaper>.
38 The other approaches for the introduction of an environmental tax are the grandfathering 
approach and the cold-turkey approach. Grandfathering would exempt from taxation a 
baseline level of emissions, such as an amount equal to emissions in a reference year. A 
cold-turkey approach would simply introduce the tax without any special provision for 
transition. For further reading see Gilbert Metcalf & David Weisback, “The Design of a 
Carbon Tax” (n 28) 516.
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then increasing the rate or base at a pre-announced schedule in order to 
reach the desired system. Setting the tax at the desired rate is complicated; 
this is evident in the proposed plan by Nigeria to set the flare penalty to the 
international market value of the gas flared. The market value of gas varies 
across continents.39
Another factor that weakened the flare penalty regime in Nigeria is weak 
enforcement. It was recently reported that, in 2012, none of the oil firms 
in Nigeria paid the new gas flare penalty of $3.50 per standard cubic foot 
because they disagreed with the penalty. The Department of Petroleum Re-
sources, charged with the task of enforcing the flare penalty, failed to enforce 
the penalty on oil companies.40 $3.9 billion is the expected damage/penalty 
on gas flaring by local and international oil companies between August 2011 
and November 2012.41 Weak enforcement has been the bane of the environ-
mental tax regime in Nigeria. The following observation was made in the 
report of the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative:
We observed that the volume of Gas produced were not declared 
before flaring. The figures in this section are calculated by the com-
pany and forwarded to the DPR after the gas must have been flared. 
This is a serious control and monitoring weakness on  the part of 
DPR whose responsibility is to ensure that JV companies provide 
it with accurate and reliable information. This should be addressed 
by the Federal Government to ensure that DPR is able to carry out 
its oversight function of monitoring the upstream sector of Oil and 
Gas industry in Nigeria.42
The Report concluded thus:
We recommend that there should be greater control over the com-
putation and payment of Gas Flared Penalty. DPR officials should 
monitor the daily production and quantity of Gas Flared by an 
operator and a certificate issued accordingly. At the end of each 
39 Gas trades for about $16 in Japan and between about $8.80 and $12 in Europe. See Carrie 
Tait, ‘Natural gas glut seeps into high price market’ Globe and Mail (April 12 2012) 
40 Soni Daniel, “Oil Firms Shun Gas Flare Penalty Payment for 2012’ Vanguard (7 November 
2012), online: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/11/oil-firms-shun-gas-flare-penalty-payment-
for-2012/>.
41  Adeola Yusuf, ‘DPR,IOCs rip-off $3.9 billion from FG’ New Telegraph(19 May 2014), 
online:http:<//newtelegraphonline.com/dpr-iocs-rip-3-9bn-fg/>
42  Report on the Financial Audit 1999-2004 Appendix 3: Gas Flare Penalty (2006)
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month, a bill for Gas Flared Penalty should be sent to the operator 
for settlement. There is need to obtain independent confirmation of 
the quantity of Gas Flared.43
It is clear from the above that lack of legislative framework for green-
house gas reporting undermines the tax regime in Nigeria. Environmental 
accountability would be built into the tax regime if there is mandatory re-
porting of GHG emissions and verification of reported data by the com-
panies. What currently goes under the tax regime in Nigeria is voluntary 
reporting. The risk with voluntary reporting is under reporting and under 
reporting means less revenue. It will ultimately lessen the effect of the tax to 
induce behavioural change.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper has provided some reflections on the desirability of the pro-posed carbon tax system in South Africa. A carbon tax system is argu-
ably suitable for South Africa because almost 90 percent of its emissions is 
from the energy sector. However, competitive concerns could weaken the 
effectiveness of the proposed tax in that trade exposed sectors will seek to 
be exempted from the tax. There is no danger of this in a cap and trade 
program because of the opportunity offered by linking the program with 
other cap and trade programs.Carbon tax and a cap and trade program are 
not mutually exclusive. They can complement each other. Carbon tax can 
be used for certain sectors of the economy, while a tradable permit scheme 
can cover the rest. This way the country will profit from the unique benefits 
of both policies.
What is more, a carbon tax is likely going to be regressive. This could 
aggravate the social inequality in South Africa. As stated in its national com-
munication to the UNFCCC, there is high social inequality in a population 
of about 50 million people, revealed by a Gini coefficient of between 0.66 
and 0.69, several poverty and human development indices emphasise this.44 
Thus, to create meaningful impacts on the average citizen, the revenue to 
be generated from the carbon tax has to go towards addressing the social 
inequality in South Africa, and not only to carbon mitigation measures. 
Ultimately, the effect of the proposed tax in South Africa can only be satis-
43  Ibid.
44  South Africa Second National Communication ( n 13) ,viii.
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factorily assessed after its implementation, which will start in 2015. This is 
meant to give companies time to adjust to the new fiscal regime on climate 
change.45 
Furthermore, as shown in the Nigerian situation, there has to be a leg-
islative framework for the mandatory reporting of emissions if the carbon 
tax system is to achieve the desired objectives. The carbon tax system must 
be backed with a robust enforcement regime to ensure its transparency and 
effectiveness.
45  Mike Cohen, ‘South Africa Delays Implementation of Carbon Tax Until 2015’ Bloomberg 
(27 February 2013).
